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Abstract:  In a world of certainty, the design of environmental policy is relatively 
straightforward, and boils down to maximizing the present value of the flow of social benefits 
minus costs.  But the real world is one of considerable uncertainty – over the physical and 
ecological impact of pollution, over the economic costs and benefits of reducing it, and over the 
discount rates that should be used to compute present values.  The implications of uncertainty are 
complicated by the fact that most environmental policy problems involve highly nonlinear 
damage functions, important irreversibilities, and long time horizons.  Correctly incorporating 
uncertainty in policy design is therefore one of the more interesting and important research areas 
in environmental economics.  This paper offers no easy formulas or solutions for treating 
uncertainty – to my knowledge, none exist.  Instead, I try to clarify the ways in which various 
kinds of uncertainties will affect optimal policy design, and summarize what we know and don’t 
know about the problem. 
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1.  Introduction  
 An introductory course in environmental economics typically teaches students that the 
design and evaluation of a policy to deal with an environmental problem boils down to cost-
benefit analysis.  The instructor might proceed as follows.  Left to their own, humans (i.e., 
producers and consumers) do bad things to the environment, such as polluting rivers and lakes, 
spewing sulfur dioxide into the air, and releasing ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).  
Government intervention – restrictions or taxes on emissions, banning CFCs – prevents some of 
this destructive behavior, and thereby reduces the amount of environmental damage.  But it does 
so at a cost (e.g., electric power producers must install expensive scrubbers, and air conditioners 
must be made with a more expensive or less efficient refrigerant).  So the policy problem boils 
down to deciding whether the benefit in terms of less environmental damage is at least as large 
as the cost of the policy.  Of course the benefits (and often some of the costs) usually occur in the 
future, and therefore must be expressed in present value terms.  So, given a discount rate, it’s all 
quite simple: calculate the present value of the benefits of a policy, subtract the present value of 
the costs, and see whether the difference (the Net Present Value, or NPV) is positive.  And if one 
is comparing several alternative policies, choose the one with the highest NPV.1
 The student, however, may start to realize that the problem is in fact more complicated: 
• First, we never really know what the benefits from reduced environmental damage will 
be, or even the amount that environmental damage will be reduced by a particular policy.  
Worse yet, we can’t know with much precision what those benefits will be, even if we 
work very hard to find out.  Take global warming.  Modern meteorological science tells 
us that the relationships between greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations, temperatures 
(regional or global) and climate patterns are inherently random.  And even if we knew 
what those changes in temperatures and climate patterns are likely to be, we know even 
less about their economic and social impact, in part because we don’t know how humans 
will adapt (e.g., by growing different crops or living in different areas).  And if you think 
global warming is an unfair example because of the very long time horizons involved, 
take acid rain.  Although virtually everyone would agree that the acidification of lakes 
and rivers – as well as the direct effects on human health – from unregulated nitrogen 
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oxide (NOx) and sulfur oxide (SOx) emissions is not a good thing, there is very little 
agreement as to just how bad it is.   
• Second, we usually don’t know what the current and future costs of a policy will be.  In 
the case of a carbon tax, for example, we don’t know how consumers and producers will 
respond, especially over the longer term.  For example, to what extent will consumers use 
less fuel and buy more fuel-efficient cars and heating systems?  And will producers 
develop and adopt more fuel-efficient technologies?  Or in the case of NOx and SOx 
emissions, we know the current cost of scrubbers, but we don’t know what their cost will 
be in the future, and how installing them will affect electricity prices and demand.  
• And third, what discount rate (or rates) should be used to calculate present values?  There 
is disagreement among economists over what is the “correct” rate that accounts properly 
for social time preferences and risk.  And even if we settled on a conceptual notion of a 
“correct” rate, e.g., society’s marginal rate of return on capital, there would still be 
considerable uncertainty over the actual numbers for current and future discount rates.  
(The marginal return on capital is difficult to measure, and its future evolution is 
inherently uncertain.)  Furthermore, as we will see, discount rate uncertainty is itself a 
determinant of the “correct” effective rate that should be used for policy evaluation. 
Of course the student might argue that there is nothing problematic about uncertainty over 
current and future benefits, costs and discount rates.  If the student had taken a basic finance 
course, she would know that firms frequently make capital investment decisions in the face of 
similar uncertainties over the future cash flows from the investment, and must select discount 
rates subject to uncertainty over the correct risk premium.  She might argue that firms typically 
base their investment decisions on the expected values of those cash flows, and environmental 
policy design can likewise be based on expected values.   
The student might also argue that most public policy decisions must be made in the face of 
uncertainty.  Possible changes in our Social Security or Medicare programs must be evaluated in 
the context of a broad set of uncertainties: over future changes in the demographic makeup of the 
country, changes in incomes, savings rates, and costs of living for different demographic groups, 
and changes in disease prevalence and medical costs, to name a few.  Likewise, it is notoriously 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 For a good textbook discussion of cost-benefit analysis applied to environmental policy, see Tietenberg (2006). 
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difficult to predict the effects of changes in tax policy on income, employment, and government 
tax revenues.  Again, what’s special about environmental policy?  
I would counter that for many environmental problems, the uncertainties are greater and 
more crucial to policy design and evaluation.  In particular, three important complications arise 
that are often crucial for environmental policy, but are usually much less important for most 
other private and public policy decisions.   
1. The first complication is that environmental cost and benefit functions tend to be highly 
nonlinear.  In other words, the damage likely to be caused by air or water pollution or by 
GHG emissions does not increase linearly with the level of pollution or emissions.  
Instead, the damage might be barely noticeable for low levels of pollution and then 
become severe or even catastrophic once some (uncertain) threshold is reached.  
Likewise, the cost of pollution abatement may be very low for low levels of abatement, 
but then become extremely high for higher or total abatement.  This means that one 
cannot simply use expected values; the expected value of the cost or benefit function will 
be very different than the function of the expected value.   
Furthermore, the precise shapes of the functions are unknown.  This is particularly 
important if we believe that there is a threshold or “tipping point” at which the impact of 
a pollutant becomes extremely severe, but we don’t know where that point is.  For 
example, how large an increase in GHG concentrations – or in mean temperature – would 
it take for the consequences to be near-catastrophic?  And at what point would over-
fishing or habitat destruction lead to the collapse or extinction of a fish or animal 
population?  A lack of answers to these questions suggests that environmental policy 
should be “precautionary,” in the sense of favoring earlier and more intense intervention.  
But just how “precautionary” should the policy be?  Should countries agree, for example, 
to roll back their GHG emissions to 1930 levels?  I do not mean to be facetious.  Rather, I 
want to stress that uncertainty over the existence and/or position of a “tipping point” can 
be critical to policy timing and design. 
2. The second complication is that environmental policies usually involve important 
irreversibilities, and those irreversibilities interact in a sometimes complicated way with 
uncertainty.  There are two kinds of irreversibilities that are relevant for environmental 
policy, and they work in opposite directions.   
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First, policies aimed at reducing environmental degradation almost always impose 
sunk costs on society.  These sunk costs can take the form of discrete investments (e.g., 
coal-burning utilities might be forced to install scrubbers), or they can take the form of 
expenditure flows (e.g., a price premium paid by a utility that has committed to burning 
low-sulfur coal).  In either case, if future policy costs and benefits are uncertain, these 
sunk costs create an opportunity cost of adopting the policy, rather than waiting for more 
information about environmental impacts and their economic consequences.  This implies 
that traditional cost-benefit analysis will be biased toward policy adoption. 
Second, environmental damage is often partly or totally irreversible.  For example, 
atmospheric accumulations of GHGs are long lasting; even if we were to drastically 
reduce GHG emissions, atmospheric concentration levels would take many years to fall.  
Likewise, the damage to ecosystems from higher global temperatures, acidified lakes and 
streams, or the clear-cutting of forests may be permanent.  This means that adopting a 
policy now rather than waiting has a sunk benefit, i.e., a negative opportunity cost.  This 
implies that traditional cost-benefit analysis will be biased against policy adoption. 
How important are these irreversibilities and what are their implications for policy?  
The answers depend on the nature and extent of the uncertainties over costs and benefits, 
and how those uncertainties are likely to get resolved over time.  The greater the current 
uncertainties, and the greater the rate at which they will be resolved, the greater will be 
the opportunity costs and benefits associated with policy adoption.   
3. Third, unlike most capital investment projects and most other public policy problems, 
environmental policies often involve very long time horizons.  While NPV calculations 
for firms’ investments rarely go beyond 20 or 25 years, the costs and especially the 
benefits from an environmental policy can extend 100 years or more.  The problems of 
global climate change and nuclear waste disposal are well-known examples with long 
time horizons, but there are others.  For some forests and the ecosystems they contain, 
clear-cutting and other interventions can have consequences that extend for many 
decades.  Likewise with chemical contaminations of land or water supplies.  And the 
extinction of a species is, by definition, forever.   
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A long time horizon exacerbates the uncertainty over policy costs and benefits.  It is 
hard enough to predict the impact of pollution, or the costs of abatement, five or ten years 
from now.  Over a 50-year horizon, the uncertainties are much greater. 
A long time horizon also makes discount rate uncertainty much more important.  
Suppose we are not sure whether the “correct” discount rate for evaluating a policy is 2 
percent or 4 percent.  (Many rates have been used in policy analysis; the OMB has 
suggested 3 percent and 7 percent for government regulatory analyses.)  With a 2 percent 
discount rate, a $100 benefit 50 years from now is worth about $37 today, but with a 4 
percent rate it is worth only $14 today.  If the $100 benefit accrues 100 years from now, 
its present value is about $14 with the 2 percent rate, but only $2 with the 4 percent rate.  
Clearly with discount rates of 4 percent or more, it would be very hard to justify almost 
any policy that imposes costs today but yields benefits only 50 or 100 years in the future. 
Uncertainty over future discount rates has an important implication for the choice of 
discount rate that we should use in practice – it makes that rate lower than any expected 
future discount rate.  The expected present value of $100 received T years from now is 
the expected value of $100/(1+R)T, where R is the (uncertain) discount rate (and 1/(1+R)T 
is called the discount factor).  But the expected value of $100/(1+R)T is greater than 
$100/(1+Re)T, where Re is the expected value of R.  Furthermore, the longer the time 
horizon (i.e., the larger is T), the greater is the difference between the expected value of 
$100/(1+R)T and $100/(1+Re)T.  This means that the effective discount rate that should be 
used in a present value calculation is less than the expected (or average) discount rate. 
 
The remainder of this paper discusses the sources and nature of the uncertainties that tend to 
arise in environmental economics, and how the policy implications of those uncertainties are 
shaped by the nonlinear nature of benefit and cost functions, by the irreversibilities that are often 
present, and by long time horizons.  The next section explains why benefits and costs are 
inherently uncertain, and discusses the nonlinear characteristics of environmental benefit and 
cost functions.  I focus in particular on uncertainty over possible “tipping points,” i.e., a 
threshold resulting in catastrophic environmental damage.  Section 3 deals with irreversibilities 
and the opportunity costs and benefits they create, and Section 4 examines the implications of 
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long time horizons and discount rate uncertainty.  The paper concludes by summarizing the 
lessons for policy design, and the areas where much more research is needed.   
Despite its title, this paper is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the many aspects 
of uncertainty in environmental economics, or the vast amount of recent and ongoing research on 
the topic.  This is, after all, an article, not a book, and I have chosen to focus on those areas 
where I have a research interest, and where I believe some elucidation would be worthwhile. 
2.  The Uncertain Nature of Benefits and Costs 
I claimed in the previous section that in comparison to many other public policy problems, 
environmental problems typically involve uncertainties that are greater and more crucial to 
policy design and evaluation.  Why?  As I explained above and will discuss in more detail below, 
environmental policy design must contend with highly nonlinear benefit and cost functions, 
irreversibilities, and long time horizons.  But in addition, environmental problems usually 
involve three compounding levels of uncertainty – uncertainty over the underlying physical or 
ecological processes, uncertainty over the economic impacts of environmental change, and 
uncertainty over technological changes that might ameliorate those economic impacts and/or 
reduce the cost of limiting the environmental damage in the first place.  (By “economic impacts,” 
I mean to include health impacts, lost consumer and producer surplus from degraded air, water, 
fisheries and other public goods, as well as lost output resulting directly from changes in climate, 
resource availability, etc.)   
These compounding levels of uncertainty apply to both the benefit and cost sides of policy 
design and evaluation.  For example, the future benefits of reducing GHG emissions depend first 
on the uncertain relationships between GHG emission levels, GHG concentrations, and resulting 
temperature distributions (as well as other climatic effects).  But those benefits also depend on 
the uncertain economic impacts of changes in temperature distributions, as well as adaptation to 
climate changes (e.g., the use of new plant varieties or irrigation methods) that might reduce 
those economic consequences.  The current and future costs of reducing anthropogenic climate 
change depend on the amount by which GHG emissions would need to be reduced, but that in 
turn depends on the uncertain relationships between GHG emission levels, concentrations, and 
climate effects, and the uncertain economic impacts of the climate effects.  (It is the economic 
impacts, broadly construed, that is the policy concern in the first place.)  And those costs also 
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depend on unpredictable technological advances in energy conservation, cheaper non-polluting 
energy sources, and methods of carbon sequestration.  
These uncertainties and their effects on policy are magnified by the often nonlinear nature of 
benefit and cost functions.  Uncertainties over benefits and costs are manifested not only in the 
form of parameter uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty over the elasticity of emissions with respect to a 
tax rate on emissions), but also in the form of uncertainty over the shapes of the (nonlinear) 
benefit and cost functions (e.g., uncertainty over how that elasticity falls as the tax rate is 
increased).  As discussed below, the problem becomes especially severe when there are “tipping 
points” (i.e., when at some level of environmental damage the consequences become near-
catastrophic), but we don’t know what that point is. 
To make the discussion over benefits and costs more concrete, I will focus on global 
warming, for which the policy implications of uncertainty have been studied extensively (but 
certainly not exhaustively).  Later I will turn to the nature and implications of uncertainty for a 
very different environmental policy problem – the regulation of a fishery. 
2.1.   Uncertainty over Benefits 
The point of environmental policy is to bring human exploitation of environmental assets 
closer to socially optimal levels, thereby creating social benefits.  We might impose a carbon tax 
to reduce the future economic impact of global warming because we expect the benefits (a 
reduced economic impact from reduced warming) to outweigh the costs of the policy.  But how 
soon should we impose a carbon tax, and how large should it be?  Putting aside costs for the 
moment, the answers depend on the specific benefit functions, i.e., on how the benefits from the 
tax vary with its size.  And the answers also depend on nature and extent of uncertainty over 
those benefits.   
The benefits over the next 100 years from reducing GHG emissions depend on (1) expected 
GHG emission levels absent abatement; (2) how rapidly atmospheric GHG concentrations will 
grow given these emission levels; (3) how higher GHG concentrations will affect global 
temperatures; and (4) how large an economic impact we should expect from higher 
temperatures.2  The uncertainties are substantial for each step in this chain.  Combining the first 
                                                 
2 I am simplifying the problem for expositional purposes.  For example, GHGs include methane as well as CO2, and 
the mix matters.  Likewise, it is not simply the change in mean temperature that matters, but also the geographic 
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three steps, if we take the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (2001) as a 
benchmark, the projected increase in mean temperature by the end of this century absent an 
abatement policy ranges from 1.4°C to 5.8°C.  This large range should not be surprising.  GHG 
emission levels are hard to predict because they depend on uncertain economic growth and 
energy intensities, and energy intensities in turn depend on unpredictable changes in energy 
prices and technologies.3  And even if emission levels were known, changes in GHG 
concentrations and changes in temperature depend on a complex physical system (with feedback 
loops that might be positive or negative) that is poorly understood.   
The economic impact of global warming is even harder to predict.  A temperature increase in 
the middle of the IPCC range – say, 2.5°C – would likely be beneficial for some regions of the 
world (e.g., Russia and Canada), harmful for other regions (e.g., India, Bangladesh, and 
Southeast Asia), and might have little or no aggregate net impact on other regions (e.g., the 
U.S.).  Given the long time horizon involved, we would expect people to adapt to changing 
temperatures and changing climates generally (e.g., by planting and developing different crops, 
and by moving from warm and low-lying areas to cooler and higher ones).  Studies have shown 
that potential adaptation is clearly important (e.g., Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994)), but 
it is still difficult to predict to what extent people will adapt, and at what cost.  
A number of studies have attempted to assess the sources and extent of uncertainty over the 
benefits from reducing GHG emissions.  One of the earliest was Nordhaus (1994b), who 
obtained estimates of the percentage loss in gross world product from a survey of natural 
scientists and economists.  Roughgarden and Schneider (1999) then used the Nordhaus survey 
results, along with other survey evidence, to back out confidence intervals for a damage function.  
Pizer (1999) developed an integrated climate-economy model, and used it to both assess 
parameter uncertainty and study its policy implications.  His model has nineteen parameters.  Six 
parameters describe economic activity, and are estimated econometrically using historical data, 
                                                                                                                                                             
distribution of temperature changes.  And of course economic impacts can be complex and vary substantially across 
geographical regions.  
3 Kelly and Kolstad (2001), for example, point out that future GHG emissions depend critically on population and 
productivity growth, which are uncertain.  Lower growth would make global warming less of a problem.  On the 
other hand, lower productivity growth implies a lower discount rate, which, as Pizer (1999) shows, increases the 
present value of the future benefits from abatement. 
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yielding a joint distribution.  Uncertainty over the remaining thirteen parameters (describing 
emissions growth, GHG retention and decay rates, control costs, and long-term population and 
productivity growth) is based on “subjective analysis.”  Other studies likewise assess uncertainty 
using subjective analysis and expert opinion; for an overview, see Heal and Kriström (2002). 
One could argue that what really matters is the possibility and consequences of temperature 
increases at or above the upper end of the IPCC range.  How likely is a 6°C temperature increase, 
and what impact would it have?  One possible scenario (absent the probability estimates) was 
depicted by Gore (2006) – large parts of New York City would be under water.  (Could New 
Yorkers adapt?  Perhaps.)  Clearly, the issue is whether for some plausible increase in 
temperature, things could get really bad, to the point where adaptation couldn’t compensate.  In 
other words, is there a tipping point in the benefit function, and if so, where is it?  Unfortunately, 
we don’t know. 
As of now, very little work has been done to assess the probabilities of catastrophic climate 
change, or to estimate the point (e.g., the change in mean temperature) at which a catastrophic 
outcome becomes likely.  People have widely differing (and often strongly held) opinions about 
the likelihood and makings of a catastrophic outcome, but this is just symptomatic of how little 
we know.  There have been studies of the policy implications of catastrophic outcomes, which I 
will discuss later, but those studies take the outcome and its characteristics as given.4  
This problem, which I will call “tipping point uncertainty,” is not unique to global warming.  
For example, studies of toxic waste disposal suggest that points could be reached that are 
catastrophic for land and water use in localized areas.  But again, there is considerable 
uncertainty as to where those points are.  
In summary, what do we know about uncertainty over the benefits of environmental policy?  
As I have tried to show, in the case of global warming, which has been studied quite extensively, 
we know very little.  That is, we know that there is a good deal of uncertainty, but we are hardly 
                                                 
4 For example, Pizer (2003) modifies the DICE model developed by Nordhaus (1994a), replacing the original 
quadratic relationship between economic damage and temperature change with a function that is much more convex 
(and varies the degree of convexity).  But his focus is on whether price versus quantity is the more effective policy 
instrument.  As he says, “Unfortunately, there is little empirical information concerning either the degree of 
steepness or the point where the steepness begins.” 
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able to quantify it, especially when it comes to tipping points.  We would come to a similar 
conclusion for environmental problems that have received less attention (e.g., acid rain and toxic 
waste).  Given that uncertainty clearly matters (as I will explain in more detail below), we seem 
to have our work cut out for us. 
2.2.   Uncertainty over Costs 
For some environmental problems, particularly those with more limited time horizons, 
policy costs are better understood and subject to less uncertainty than are the benefits.  For 
example, we have years of experience with limits on SOx and NOx emissions from coal-burning 
power plants.  We know the cost (and effectiveness) of scrubbers and of substituting low-sulfur 
coal, and we can also infer costs from prices of tradable emission allowances. And while the cost 
function for emission controls is nonlinear (the cost of an incremental reduction in emissions 
rises rapidly as the emission level becomes very low), there is no “tipping point” problem.   
For other environmental problems, however, cost uncertainty can be quite severe.  Once 
again, global warming is a good example.  A carbon tax may be the preferred instrument for 
reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, but how large a tax would it take to reduce those 
emissions in the U.S. by, say, 20 percent?5  The answer depends on how responsive fossil fuel 
demand would be to tax-induced price changes, and this will vary from sector to sector (e.g., 
transportation versus residential heating).  The responsiveness of fossil fuel demand in any sector 
to price changes in turn depends on the long-run price elasticity of energy demand in the sector, 
and the long-run elasticity of substitution between fossil and non-fossil energy sources.  We have 
a reasonable understanding of energy demand elasticities, but our knowledge of the long-run 
elasticity of substitution between fossil and non-fossil energy sources is tenuous at best.  The 
reason is that the ability to substitute from, say, coal to wind power for electricity production 
depends on the cost and availability of the latter (and that cost will depend in part on its 
environmental impact).  Today, that substitutability is quite limited; what it would be 20 or 50 
years from now depends in large part on technological change, which is, again, hard to predict.    
                                                 
5 We would also need to know how large a tax it would take to reduce emissions in other countries, and for 
developing countries like China and India, the uncertainties are far greater than for the OECD.  Then there is the 
cost of free riding.  How large a tax would be needed for the OECD countries if the larger developing countries did 
not also agree to reduce emissions? 
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Another way to look at this is to ask whether (and how fast) the cost difference between 
fossil-based and alternative energy supplies will converge.  Solar, wind, and biomass costs have 
fallen over the past twenty years, but the differences are still very large.  There is reason to think 
that over the next fifty years, those differences may decline or even disappear as fossil fuel prices 
rise (because of depletion) and costs of alternative energy sources fall (because of technological 
change and economies of scale).  Chakravorty, Roumasset, and Tse (1997) have developed an 
empirical model of this process that takes into account the depletion of the potentially 
discoverable reserves of fossil fuels.  They project that the world will move towards wide-scale 
use of solar energy, so that “90 percent of the world’s coal will never be used,” and global 
temperature will rise only about 1.5 to 2°C over the next century, making the cost of mitigation 
low indeed.   However, since standard errors are missing, one cannot attach confidence intervals 
to these optimistic forecasts.  Other forecasts suggest starkly different results, with fossil fuels 
remaining the predominant energy source in the absence of major policy changes.  
The basic problem is that with long time horizons, policy costs depend on technological 
change, which is inherently difficult to predict.  In fact, it is difficult to even characterize the 
uncertainty over technological change.  Thus, for global warming and other long-horizon 
environmental problems, the cost side of policy is subject to uncertainty over the uncertainty.  
2.3.  Implications for Policy Design. 
Uncertainties over benefits and costs can affect policy design in at least three fundamental 
ways.  First, they can affect the optimal choice of policy instrument, i.e., whether pollution is 
best controlled through a price-based instrument (e.g., an emissions tax) or a quantity-based 
instrument (e.g., an emissions quota).  Second, they can affect the optimal policy intensity, e.g., 
the optimal size of the tax or the optimal level of abatement.  Third, they can affect the optimal 
timing of policy implementation, i.e., whether it is best to put an emissions tax in place now, or 
wait several years (and thereby reduce some of the uncertainty). 
Choice of Policy Instrument.  The implications of uncertainty for the optimal choice of 
policy instrument has been studied extensively, beginning with the seminal paper by Weitzman 
(1974), who showed that in the presence of cost uncertainty, whether a price-based instrument or 
a quantity-based instrument is best depends on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit 
function and marginal cost function.  If the marginal benefit function is steeply sloped but the 
 12
marginal cost function is relatively flat, a quantity-based instrument (e.g., an emissions quota) is 
preferable: an error in the amount of emissions can be quite costly, but not so for an error in the 
cost of the emissions reduction.  The opposite would be the case if the marginal cost function is 
steeply sloped and the marginal benefit function is flat.  Of course in a world of certainty, either 
instrument will be equally effective.  If there is substantial uncertainty and the slopes of the 
marginal benefit and cost functions differ considerably, the choice of instrument can be crucial. 
Weitman’s original result has been extended in a number of directions.  For example, 
Stavins (1996) showed that a positive correlation between marginal benefits and marginal costs 
pushes the optimal choice towards a quantity instrument.  Often, however, there is no need to 
choose exclusively between a price and a quantity instrument.  A number of studies have shown 
that in the presence of uncertainty, “hybrid” policies that combine both instruments generally 
dominate the use of a single instrument (e.g., Roberts and Spence (1976), Weitzman (1978), and 
in the context of climate change policy, Pizer (2002) and Jacoby and Ellerman (2004)).  The 
optimal design of a hybrid policy depends not only on the shapes of the benefit and cost 
functions, but also on the nature and extent of the uncertainties.  Our lack of knowledge of the 
uncertainties (and often the shapes of the functions) means that policy design will be sub-optimal 
at best; much more work is needed to get a better understanding of just how sub-optimal. 
Policy Intensity.  Uncertainties over benefits and costs can also affect the optimal policy 
intensity, i.e., the size of an emissions tax or the amount of abatement that should be mandated.  
If there are no irreversibilities (which are discussed below), then in many cases uncertainty will 
lead to a lower policy intensity.   
Suppose the policy instrument is an emissions quota, which we can think of as an amount of 
abatement between 0 and 100 percent.  The greater the abatement, the greater will be the 
resulting benefit, and the greater will be the cost.  However, in many cases we would expect the 
benefit function to be concave: increasing the abatement from 0 to 10 percent will have a large 
incremental benefit, whereas increasing the abatement from 90 to 100 percent is likely to have a 
much smaller incremental benefit.  (This would be the case, for example, if a high level of 
pollution has serious health effects, so that there is a substantial benefit even from reducing 
emissions by 10 percent, whereas a low level of pollution has negligible health effects, so that 
there is very little added benefit from going from a 90 percent to 100 percent emissions 
reduction.)  Likewise, the cost of abatement is usually convex: going from no abatement to a 10 
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percent reduction in emissions is likely to be much less costly than going from a 90 percent 
reduction to a 100 percent reduction.  If the uncertainties over benefits and costs are proportional 
to the amount of abatement, it follows that the optimal amount of abatement (which equates 
expected benefits with expected costs) will be lower than in the absence of uncertainty.6  On the 
other hand, if there is no cost uncertainty, and the uncertainty over benefits is proportional to the 
level of emissions (as opposed to the abatement level), the optimal abatement would be higher 
than in the absence of uncertainty. 
One might ask whether the possibility that little or no abatement would lead to a catastrophic 
outcome might increase the optimal abatement level.  It is important not to confuse the expected 
benefit from abatement with the variance of that benefit.  The possibility of a catastrophe will 
likely increase the expected benefit from any amount of abatement, which, other things equal, 
implies a greater optimal abatement level.  But if we are interested in the effect of uncertainty 
alone, we must keep the expected benefit fixed as we increase the variance of the benefit.   
Policy Timing.  Uncertainty can also affect the optimal timing of policy implementation – 
but only if there are sunk costs of implementing the policy and/or the environmental damage 
from having no policy in place is at least partly irreversible.  Depending on the particular 
situation, it may be optimal to defer the implementation of a policy until we learn more about 
benefits and costs, or to speed up the implementation to avoid irreversible damage.  I address this 
implication of uncertainty below as I discuss irreversibilities. 
3.  Irreversibilities 
It has been understood for many years that environmental damage can be irreversible, and 
that this can lead to a more “conservationist” policy than would be optimal otherwise.  To my 
knowledge, the earliest economic studies to make this point are Arrow and Fisher (1974) and 
Henry (1974).  But thanks to Joni Mitchell, even non-economists know that if we “pave paradise 
and put up a parking lot,” paradise may be gone forever.  And if the value of paradise to future 
generations is uncertain, the benefit from protecting it today should include an “option value,” 
                                                 
6 Suppose the cost of abatement is C(A) = c[(1+ε)A]2, where c is a constant, A is the percentage abatement, and ε is 
random and equal to either –1 or +1, each with probability ½, so the expected value of ε is 0. Using this expected 
value, the cost of abatement is cA2.  However, the expected cost of abatement is ½c(0 + 4A2) = 2cA2.  The 
uncertainty over ε increases the expected cost of abatement, making the optimal amount of abatement smaller. 
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which pushes the cost-benefit calculation towards protection.7  Thus it might make sense to 
restrict commercial development in a wilderness area, even if today very few people care at all 
about that wilderness or have any desire to visit it.  After all, if it becomes clear over the next 
few decades that very few people will ever care much about that wilderness, we will still have 
the option to pave it over.  But if we exercise the option and pave over the wilderness today, we 
will lose the flexibility that the option gave us.  If the social value of the wilderness rises sharply 
over time, the social loss from having exercised our option prematurely could be great. 
There is a second kind of irreversibility, however, that works in the opposite direction:  
Protecting paradise can impose sunk costs on society.  If paradise is the wilderness area, 
restricting development and human access would imply a (permanently) foregone flow of wage 
and consumption benefits (e.g., from a large ski resort).  If paradise is clean air and water, 
protecting it could imply discrete sunk cost investments in abatement equipment, and/or an 
ongoing flow of sunk costs for more expensive production processes.  In both cases, these costs 
are permanent – we cannot recapture them in the future should we decide that clean air and water 
are less important then we had originally thought.  The point is that this kind of irreversibility 
would lead to policies that are less “conservationist” than they would be otherwise.  
The implications of irreversibilities have been explored in a large and growing literature.8  
The important questions relate to the conditions under which irreversibilities matter for policy, 
and the extent to which they matter. 
3.1.  When Do Irreversibilities Matter? 
It is important to stress that these irreversibilities only matter if there is uncertainty.  To see 
why, suppose that today we know precisely how society will value a pristine wilderness area 
every year over the next 200 years, and we also know what would be the annual flow of profits, 
                                                 
7 “Option value” and “quasi-option value” have been used in the environmental economics literature in different and 
sometimes confusing ways.  Arrow and Fisher (1974) referred to the value of waiting when environmental damage 
is irreversible as “quasi-option value.”  The term “quasi-option value” has been adopted by other authors, who use 
“option value” to refer to the value of delay because of risk aversion.  See, e.g., Conrad (1980), Freeman (1984), and 
Hanemann (1989).  I will use the term “option value” to refer to any opportunity costs or benefits resulting from 
irreversibilities and uncertainty.  This is consistent with the real options literature, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
and with modern textbook usage, e.g., Tietenberg (2006).  
8 Fisher and Hanemann (1990) and Gollier et al (2000) extend the results of Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry 
(1974), as do Scheinkman and Zariphopoulou (2001), but using a continuous-time model.  Kolstad (1996b) and 
Ulph and Ulph (1997) address conditions under which irreversibilities matter.  Implications for the timing of policy 
adoption are studied in Pindyck (2000, 2002).  These are examples; for a survey, see Heal and Kriström (2002). 
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wages, and consumer surplus over that same period from the conversion of that wilderness into a 
large commercial resort.  Finally, suppose we know the correct discount rates that would apply 
over that 200 year period.  We could then calculate present values and do a simple cost-benefit 
comparison of the pristine wilderness and the commercial resort.  If the comparison favored the 
resort, we could allow commercial development, knowing that nothing would change in the 
future that would lead to regret and a desire to “un-do” the loss of the wilderness.  Likewise, if 
the comparison favored the wilderness, we could prevent commercial development, knowing that 
nothing would change that would lead to regret over the loss of surplus from a resort.  
Irreversibility would be irrelevant.   
The environmental economics literature has also been concerned with the question of when 
irreversibility matters in terms of affecting current decisions, even if there is uncertainty (e.g., 
Kolstad (1996b) and Ulph and Ulph (1997)).  The short answer is that irreversibility will affect 
current decisions if it would constrain future behavior under plausible outcomes.  Consider 
global warming and suppose that benefits and costs are completely linear and there is no risk 
aversion.  Then the relevant constraint is that while we could (at great cost) have zero emissions 
in the future, we cannot have negative emissions.9  If there is a non-negligible chance that we 
might want to have negative emissions in the future, the irreversibility constraint might bind, and 
should lead to lower emissions today.  However, irreversibility could matter even if there is no 
chance we would want negative emissions.  Suppose, for example, that the cost of reducing 
emissions rises more than proportionally with the amount of the reduction.  In that case, we 
would lower emissions today by an amount of, say, x, so that we could avoid having to lower 
them in the future by 2x at a cost that is more than twice as large.  
The presence of uncertainty can affect policy even if there are no irreversibilities, but in a 
more limited way than if irreversibilities are present.  As explained earlier, uncertainty can affect 
policy because of nonlinear cost or benefit functions, or discount rate uncertainty.  For example, 
suppose the environmental impact of air pollution was completely reversible so that each year 
society could impose a quota on the pollutant concentration, at a cost proportional to the quota.  
Suppose also that each year the actual concentration equaled the quota plus a zero-mean 
proportional error.  Finally, suppose (realistically) that the adverse health effect of pollution rises 
                                                 
9 This is not precisely correct.  With near-zero emissions and a carbon sequestration program, effective emissions 
could be made negative.  But as a practical matter, negative emissions are hard to imagine.  
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more than proportionally with the concentration, so that the benefit loss from a 5-percent 
unexpected increase in the concentration above the mandated quota is greater than the benefit 
gain from a 5-percent unexpected decrease.  Compared to the case of no random errors, the 
optimal quota would then be lower.   
But now suppose the atmospheric accumulation of this pollutant is very long-lived, so that 
emissions could be reduced, but not the accumulation of past emissions.  Because each year’s 
actual emissions is partly random, future concentrations are likewise random, and the variance of 
those concentrations will grow with the time horizon.  In this case, the policy implications of 
uncertainty are much greater.  The reason is that the range of possible future concentrations is far 
greater, and should those concentrations turn out to be very large, we will be stuck with them – 
we cannot “un-do” the emissions quotas of the past which ex post have turned out to be too high.  
As a result, the optimal policy would call for a smaller quota than would be the case if 
accumulations of the pollutant were very short-lived. 
It is important to be clear about why irreversibility is key.  Returning to our example, the fact 
that accumulations of the pollutant are long-lived creates a possibility of severe regret which is 
not offset by the possibility of very little pollution.  A “bad-news principle” is at work here:  If 
future concentrations of the pollutant turn out to be less than expected (“good news”), or if the 
economic and health impact of the pollution turns out to be less than expected (more “good 
news”) we could always relax the quota.  But if future concentrations and/or the economic and 
health impact turn out to be greater than expected (“bad news”), there is little we can do to 
correct the situation.  Even if we make our quota much more stringent, it will take many years 
for the concentrations to fall.  It is this possibility of “bad news” that affects current policy, and 
the greater the uncertainty, the greater that possibility.10  
   In the example above, I focused on the irreversibility of environmental damage, but the 
optimal policy would also be affected by the irreversibility inherent in the sunk costs of 
abatement.  To see this, suppose that atmospheric accumulations of this pollutant were very 
short-lived, but to abate, companies would have to install long-lived equipment.  Then, if we 
later learn that the economic and health impact of the pollutant are much less than expected, we 
will be stuck with the equipment – we cannot “un-do” the emission quotas of the past which ex 
                                                 
10 This point was introduced by Bernanke (1983), and is discussed in detail in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  The 
extension to environmental policy (and the “good news principle” discussed below) is in Pindyck (2002). 
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post have turned out to be too small.  In effect, a “good news principle” would apply: It is the 
possibility that the harm from the pollutant will turn out to be less than expected (“good news”) 
that would lead to regret.  As a result, the optimal policy would call for lower mandated 
abatement than would be the case if the capital equipment used to abate were very short-lived. 
3.2.  How Do Irreversibilities Affect Policy?  
We have seen that irreversibilities can interact with uncertainty to affect current policy, 
sometimes making it more and sometimes less “conservationist.”  But how important are 
irreversibilities, and what is their overall effect on policy?  If we ignore them, would we be led 
seriously astray when designing policies to deal with, say, global warming or toxic waste 
disposal?  And would taking them into account make us more or less “conservationist?” 
As one would expect, the answers depend on the particular policy problem.  Unfortunately, 
there are very few policy problems for which the effects of irreversibilities have been studied in 
any detail.  Not surprisingly, the problem that has received the most attention in this context is 
global warming, a problem for which we have a good sense of the irreversibilities involved, and 
as discussed earlier, the uncertainties are considerable.  But even here, we have no clear answers 
as to the importance of irreversibilities and the overall effect they have on policy.  The reason is 
that to determine the optimal abatement policy for any realistic climate-economy model, one 
must solve (analytically or numerically) a complex stochastic dynamic programming problem.  
Thus, researchers have had to make strong simplifying assumptions, and different sets of 
simplifying assumptions have led to quite different results.  This is best seen by summarizing the 
approaches and results of several of the studies published over the past decade.  
One of the most common simplifying assumptions is to limit time to two periods, so the 
question becomes how much emissions should be reduced now versus in the future.  This was 
the approach used by Kolstad (1996b) in one of the earliest studies of the opposing 
irreversibilities – long-lasting GHG concentrations versus long-lived abatement capital – 
involved with global warming.  He examined how the prospect of more information about the 
economic impact of GHGs in the second period would affect sunk expenditures on abatement in 
the first period.  Not surprisingly, both irreversibilities can matter, but the net effect on first-
period policy depends on the relative decay or depreciation rates of GHG concentrations and 
abatement capital, and on the expected benefit of abatement.   
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In another study, Kolstad (1996a) adapts the Nordhaus (1994a) DICE model by introducing 
uncertainty – which is reduced as learning occurs – over whether global warming will be a “big” 
or “little” problem.  He calculates the optimal abatement policy over 20 ten-year periods, and 
finds that only the irreversibility associated with abatement capital matters, so that near-term 
policy should be less conservationist.  The reason is that temperature change from GHG build-up 
is sufficiently slow so that emissions could always be slightly reduced in the future.  Using a 
two-period model, also with functional forms and parameters taken from the DICE model, Fisher 
and Narain (2003) likewise find that the investment irreversibility effect is much larger than the 
GHG irreversibility effect, so that uncertainty over the impact of climate change leads to a 
reduction in first-period abatement.   
In Pindyck (1998, 2000, 2002), I develop continuous-time models in which there is ongoing 
uncertainty over both the benefits from reduced GHG concentrations and the evolution of those 
concentrations, concentrations are long-lived, and there are sunk costs of policy adoption.  I 
focus on the timing and size of a single permanent reduction in emissions (with the sunk cost of 
abatement a quadratic function of the size of the reduction).  I find that for a “reasonable” range 
of parameters, either kind of uncertainty leads to a higher threshold for policy adoption and a less 
stringent reduction in emissions.  The reason is that policy adoption commits to a reduction in 
the entire trajectory of future emissions at a large sunk cost, while inaction over any short time 
interval only involves continued emissions over that interval.11  
The studies cited above, however, do not consider possible catastrophic impacts of GHG 
accumulations.   Those that do consider catastrophic impacts find that they can lead to earlier and 
more stringent abatement policies, but only if the likelihood of a catastrophe is strongly linked to 
the GHG concentration.  This ambiguous result is shown clearly in Clarke and Reed (1994), who 
develop a simple but revealing theoretical model in which consumption causes the emission of 
an accumulating pollutant (so that reducing emissions requires consuming less), and the 
catastrophe is a random (Poisson) arrival in which welfare is reduced permanently to zero.  The 
                                                 
11 Newell and Pizer (2003b) and Pizer (2005) also develop dynamic models to study optimal policies when GHG 
concentrations are long-lived (but abatement capital is not).  They focus on the choice of policy instrument, and 
show that despite the irreversibility, price-based policies (e.g., taxes) are strongly preferred to quantity-based 
policies (e.g., tradable emission allowances).  Kelly and Kolstad (1999) examine the implications of learning (e.g., 
about parameters of the benefit function).  They show that the ability to learn can imply larger emissions now, 
because a greater GHG concentration provides more information about parameter values.  Gollier, Jullien, and 
Treich (2000) use a two-period model with irreversibility and learning to show how effects of uncertainty depend on 
the shape of the representative consumer’s utility function. 
 19
hazard rate could be a constant, or it could be an increasing function of the stock of pollutant.  
They show that if the hazard rate is a constant, we should accept more pollution now, because we 
will all be dead (or at least have zero welfare) at some point in the future that is unrelated to how 
much we pollute.  On the other hand, if the hazard rate is sufficiently increasing with the stock of 
pollutant, we should pollute less now, because that will lengthen our expected remaining time on 
the planet.  If the hazard rate increases only slowly with the stock of pollutant, the impact on the 
current level of pollution could go either way.   
In related work, Tsur and Zemel (1996) derive optimal abatement policies using a model in 
which an undesirable (possibly catastrophic) event is triggered when the stock of pollutant 
reaches a critical level – but that critical level is unknown.  This kind of event uncertainty leads 
to strongly cautionary behavior: The optimal emissions policy keeps the stock of pollutant within 
a fixed interval. Finally, Pizer (2003) studies catastrophic outcomes by replacing the quadratic 
relationship between economic damage and temperature change in the Nordhaus (1994a) DICE 
model with a more convex function, and varies the degree of convexity.  But there are no sunk 
costs of adoption, and his focus is on whether price versus quantity is the more effective policy 
instrument. 
So where does this leave us in terms of the policy implications for global warming?  The 
irreversibilities are clear, and the uncertainties are great.  Should we adopt a stringent emissions 
reduction policy now, despite its cost, or go slowly and wait to learn more about the rate of 
global warming and its likely economic impact?  To my knowledge, research to date does not 
give us the answer.  Those studies cited above that ignore possible catastrophic impacts provide 
some evidence that we should move slowly.  Those studies that do consider the possibility of 
catastrophic impacts suggest a more stringent emissions policy, but the catastrophic impacts in 
those studies are more or less assumed, rather than inferred from empirical evidence.  Once 
again, we have a good understanding of the economic theory, but a poor understanding of its 
implementation in practice. 
3.3.  Renewable Resource Management 
So far, I have characterized environmental irreversibility in terms of a stock externality – 
emissions cause the build-up of a pollutant (e.g., GHGs), and it takes a long time for the stock of 
pollutant to dissipate.  But environmental irreversibilities can arise in other ways, such as species 
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extinction or permanent loss of a wilderness area.  An interesting area of environmental 
economics in which irreversibilities and uncertainty arise and interact in ways quite different 
from, say, global warming, is the management of a renewable resource such as a fishery.   
The regulation of a fishery can be a complex problem even if the resource has a single 
owner.  The problem becomes more complex (and of greater interest to environmental 
economists) when the resource is common property (i.e., there is open access).  In both cases, the 
problem is how to regulate extraction (fishing) so as to maximize the economic value of the 
resource.  There is a large literature on this topic, but most of the early work assumed that the 
growth function for the resource stock is known and deterministic, so that the dynamics of the 
stock can be described by a simple differential equation in which the rate of change of the stock 
equals the growth function minus the extraction rate.  Thus, left to its own, the stock of fish will 
increase to some natural carrying capacity, but over-fishing will lead to a stock below the 
optimal level, or even drive the stock permanently to zero.12  The environmental irreversibility 
arises because it may take some time for the stock to recover from over-fishing, and it will never 
recover if it is driven to zero. 
Uncertainty enters into the problem because the resource growth function is in fact 
stochastic, and sometimes highly stochastic.  In other words, the rate of change of the resource 
stock is not a deterministic function of the current stock level minus the rate of extraction.  
Instead, the stock dynamics must be described by a stochastic differential equation.  
Furthermore, we often can’t observe the actual resource stock, but can only estimate its value 
subject to error.  The optimal resource management problem then becomes a problem in 
stochastic dynamic programming, and its solution can be quite complicated.   
How do stochastic fluctuations in resource growth affect the optimal regulated extraction 
rate?  As with the global warming problem discussed above, there is no clear answer.  Depending 
on the particular growth function and the characteristics of the extraction cost and resource 
demand functions, stochastic fluctuations could lead to a higher or lower regulated extraction 
rate.  But there is an analogy with global warming.  As a catastrophic outcome becomes a more 
distinct possibility, the optimal policy becomes more conservationist, i.e., an increase in the 
volatility of stochastic fluctuations in the resource stock leads to a reduction in the extraction 
                                                 
12 For an excellent textbook treatment of renewable resource management and review of the early literature, see 
Clark (1990). 
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rate.  The reason is that as the stock becomes smaller, there is a greater chance for a stochastic 
decline in the stock to (irreversibly) drive the resource to extinction.13
4.  Discounting Over Long Time Horizons 
The role of uncertainty in policy design is especially important for environmental problems 
that involve long time horizons.  First, it is difficult enough to predict the costs and benefits over 
the next decade of reducing air or water pollution.  Over a 50-year horizon, unpredictable 
technological change, changes in land and water use, and population shifts make the 
uncertainties over policy costs and benefits far greater.  Second, discount rates are inherently 
uncertain, and a long time horizon makes that uncertainty extremely important.  If the discount 
rate is “high” it will be difficult to justify almost any policy that imposes costs on society today 
but yields benefits only 50 to 100 years from now, so the size of the discount rate can be the 
make or break factor in policy evaluation.  Third, uncertainty over future discount rates impacts 
the choice of discount rate that we should actually use in practice – it makes that rate lower than 
any expected future rate.  I have already discussed the first and second of these three aspects of 
long-horizon uncertainty, so I will focus here on the third aspect – the fact that discount rate 
uncertainty reduces the effective discount rate that should be used for policy evaluation.14   
As explained earlier, this is a straightforward implication of the fact that the discount factor is 
1/(1+R)T, so with R uncertain, the expected discount factor is greater than the discount factor 
calculated using the expected value of R.  A simple example might help to clarify this.  Suppose 
we want to evaluate the expected present value of a $100 benefit to be received 100 years from 
now, but we believe that the “correct” discount rate over the entire 100 years will turn out to be 
either 0 or 10 percent, each with probability ½.  If we apply the expected value of the discount 
rate, i.e., 5 percent, the $100 future benefit will have a present value of less than $1.  But in fact 
the expected present value of the benefit is much higher than $1.  If the true discount rate turns 
out to be 0, the present value would be $100, but if the discount rate turns out to be 10 percent, 
                                                 
13 I make no attempt to survey the literature on renewable resource management under uncertainty, but examples 
include Pindyck (1984) and, more recently, Singh, Weninger, and Doyle (2006).  Weitzman (2002) shows that even 
with severe stochastic fluctuations in the resource stock, landing fees dominate quotas as a policy instrument. 
14 By “effective discount rate,” I mean the single rate that could be used in place of the range of possible future rates.  
The fact that the effective discount rate is reduced by uncertainty over future rates has been discussed in detail by 
Weitzman (1998) and Newell and Pizer (2003).  To my knowledge, this result was first formally demonstrated by 
Dybvig, Ingersoll, and Ross (1996), although in a different context. 
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the present value would be close to zero.  Thus the expected present value of the $100 benefit is 
½($100) + ½($0) = $50.  Now ask what single discount rate when applied to a $100 benefit 
received 100 years from now would yield a present value of $50?  The answer is about 0.7 
percent.  Thus even though the expected value of the discount rate is 5 percent, the uncertainty (it 
could in fact be either 0 or 10 percent) implies an effective discount rate of less than 1 percent.  
Thus discount rate uncertainty reduces the effective discount rate that should be used to 
calculate present values.  Of course the size of the reduction depends on the extent of the 
uncertainty.  In the example I just gave, if the expected value of the discount rate were 5 percent 
but the range for the actual rate were between 4 percent and 6 percent, the effective rate would 
be only slightly less than 5 percent (4.58 percent, to be precise).  This just means that 
understanding the nature and extent of discount rate uncertainty is a crucial step in doing the 
actual discounting, and thereby evaluating a policy that is expected to yield long-term benefits.   
One approach to evaluating discount rate uncertainty is to estimate the parameters of the 
stochastic process followed by an appropriate interest rate.  To do this, one needs a very long 
historical time series for the interest rate, which is problematic.  Newell and Pizer (2003a) used 
this “reduced-form” approach by estimating an autoregressive equation for the interest rate using 
some 200 years of data on government bond rates.  Putting the quality of the data aside, they 
found uncertainty to have a substantial effect on the discount rate for horizons of 100 years or 
more.  For example, depending on the particular estimated interest rate equation, they find that 
the value today of $100 to be received 100 (200) years from now is only $1.98 ($0.04) using a 
constant 4 percent discount rate, but is between $2.61 and $5.09 ($0.10 and $1.54) when 
uncertainty is taken into account.  
Another approach is to note that what really matters are the tails of the distribution for future 
interest rates, and to try to estimate that part of the distribution.  Over the long run, changes in 
real interest rates will come from changes in real economic growth, so what we want is the 
distribution for future real growth rates, and in particular, the tails of that distribution.  For 
example, the possibility of rare disasters (not necessarily environmental in origin) would yield 
“fat tails” for the distribution of future real interest rates, and thereby considerably reduce the 
current effective discount rate.  Barro (2005) extrapolates from the wars and depressions 
experienced by a variety of countries over the past century, and shows that possible disasters can 
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make the effective discount rate close to zero.15  However, the number of wars and depressions 
is limited, making it difficult to pinpoint the effective discount rate.16
What discount rate, then, should be used should be used to evaluate costs and benefits over 
long time horizons?  The studies mentioned above do not give us a clear answer.  However, they 
do show that the correct rate should decline over the horizon and for the distant future is 
probably well below 2 percent, which is lower than the rates often used for environmental cost-
benefit analysis.  Thus costly environmental policies whose benefits will come 100 years from 
now may indeed be justifiable.17  
5.  Conclusions. 
Uncertainty is central to environmental policy.  For most environmental problems, we have 
very limited knowledge of the underlying physical or ecological processes, the economic impacts 
of environmental change, and the possible technological changes that might occur and that would 
ameliorate the economic impacts and/or reduce policy costs.  If costs and benefits were linear 
and both environmental damage and policy costs were reversible, these uncertainties would not 
complicate matter much; policies could be based on expected values of costs and benefits at each 
point in the future.  But as I have tried to show, cost and benefit functions tend to be highly 
nonlinear, and both environmental damage and policy costs are often irreversible.  As a result, it 
can be misleading to base policy on expected values of costs and benefits.  
Then how should we base policy?  Unfortunately, there are no simple guidelines or rules of 
thumb for adapting environmental policies to uncertainty, at least that I am aware of.  As we 
have seen, the irreversibilities associated with environmental damage and policy costs work in 
                                                 
15 Barro’s objective is to explain well-known asset-pricing puzzles, of which a near-zero real risk-free interest rate is 
one.  (Another is the large observed risk premium on the market, which seems only to be consistent with an 
unreasonably high index of risk aversion on the part of investors.)  Weitzman (2006) takes another approach to the 
same set of puzzles.  He shows that parameter uncertainty (in terms of both the mean and the variance) with respect 
to the structure of the economy will lead to fat tails, which likewise imply near-zero real risk-free interest rates, and 
explain the large observed market risk premium. 
16 In an engaging book, Posner (2004) examines a wide range of possible catastrophic events ranging from flu 
pandemics to nuclear war to an asteroid hitting the earth.  Although his estimates of the probabilities are largely 
subjective, the number of possible events is large enough and the economic impacts severe enough to make one 
think that Barro’s study is overly optimistic, and the left tail of the real growth rate distribution is quite fat indeed. 
17 Also, there is evidence that consumers’ subjective discount rates are much higher for short-run than long-run 
outcomes.  For an overview of behavioral approaches to discount rates, see Frederick et. al. (2002).  Weitzman 
(2001) also provides evidence of higher short-run than long-run rates, and shows that economists differ widely in 
their opinions regarding discount rates.  
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opposite directions, so their net effect tends to be model-specific.  Recent studies of global 
warming that ignore catastrophic impacts show a net effect that favors waiting over early action.  
That result can be turned around in models in which the health and economic impact rises at a 
sharply increasing rate with the amount of pollutant, e.g., if at some level the pollutant could 
have a catastrophic impact.  This would especially be the case if the point at which a catastrophic 
outcome would occur is unknown.  However, even for well-studied problems like global 
warming, we know very little about the likelihood of catastrophic impacts.  Furthermore, most 
other environmental problems (e.g., deforestation and toxic waste disposal) have received much 
less attention, so we know even less about the characteristics of the cost and benefit functions in 
these cases.  
We have made greater progress in terms of understanding the discount rates that should be 
used to evaluate policies for which impacts occur over very long time horizons.  The very fact 
that the marginal return on capital, and thus real interest rates, are stochastic implies that the 
effective discount rate should be lower than some kind of average expected rate, and a rate close 
to zero is not implausible.  But what matters is the tail of the distribution, i.e., the probabilities of 
one or more severe economic contractions over the next century, and given our (fortunately) 
limited experience with severe contractions, we are left with ranges of plausible discount rates.  
And while zero and two percent may both be plausible numbers, they can have very different 
implications when policy benefits occur 100 years from now.  
The good news is that environmental economists have plenty of work to do, and need not 
plan on early retirement.  Likewise for physical scientists working on environmental problems.  
It seems to me that at least one major focus of research should be on the causes and likelihood of 
severe or catastrophic outcomes, and this will likely involve collaboration between economists 
and physical scientists.  And while global warming is an important problem, more work is 
needed on other problems that may eventually turn out to be even more pressing, such as the 
depletion or degradation of water resources, acid rain, toxic (and non-toxic) waste disposal, and 
the loss of wilderness and wildlife.  
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